• Managerial Incentives for Technology Transfer 

      Clark, Derek J.; Michalsen, Anita (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-03-27)
      This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the ...
    • Technology transfer and R&D policy in a knowledge-based society 

      Michalsen, Anita (Doctoral thesis; Doktorgradsavhandling, 2012-06-01)
      Abstract My thesis focuses on technology transfer and innovation policy in a knowledge-based society. In particular, I analyse the firms’ incentives to invest in research and development (R&D), the transfer of technological knowledge to a rival and government stimulation of R&D investment. Further, I analyse the incentives to engage in R&D cooperation in different market structures. By coordinating ...
    • The EU block exemption and horizontal R&D agreements 

      Clark, Derek John; Michalsen, Anita; Olsen, Leif Roger (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel, 2020-09-24)
      We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms ...